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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF SAME-SEX SEXUAL




As the most-litigated disease in our nation's history,' Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus-Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV-
AIDS) frequently challenges the courts to separate reasoned arguments
from arguments based on misinformation, prejudice and hysteria. A
major national study recently concluded that society subjects people af-
fected by HIV-AIDS to discrimination in employment, 2 health care,3 in-
surance 4 and criminal law. 5 The stigma of HIV disease 6 has particularly
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1. See Larry 0. Gostin, AIDS Litigation Project II: A National Survey of Federal, State, &
Local Cases Before the Courts and Human Rights Commissions (1991) (available from the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, National AIDS Program Of-
fice). The AIDS Litigation Project (ALP) tallied 444 AIDS-related cases by June 1, 1989.
Eighteen months later, in January, 1991, the ALP recorded 372 cases (the vast majority
were not included in the earlier study). The ALP report provides expansive detail of both
discrimination against persons with HIV-AIDS and ignorance of scientific evidence con-
cerning the disease.
2. See, e.g., Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (awarding plaintiff
$157,888.18 in damages against employer who discharged plaintiff after learning he con-
tracted AIDS).
3. See, e.g., Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs brought suit
against Missouri Medicaid officials who denied Medicaid coverage for the anti-viral drug
AZT to AIDS patients eligible for Medicaid).
4. See, e.g., William Penn Life Ins. v. Sands, 912 F.2d 1359 (11 th Cir. 1990) (insurer
refused to pay coverage on life insurance of deceased, who died of AIDS, and sought to
rescind life insurance policy of deceased's beneficiary, who also had AIDS, although
neither applicant misstated his health status at time of application).
5. See, e.g., Wiggins v. State, 602 A.2d 212 (Md. App. 1989) (homosexual defendant
of unknown HIV status was, under order of the trial judge, escorted to and from court by
guards wearing rubber gloves).
6. Many health care professionals now view the term AIDS as arbitrary and outmo-
ded. Of broader application are the terms HIV illness and HIV infection, which encom-
pass the effects of HIV on those who have tested positive for antibodies to the virus, not
just those who fall within the prevailing definition of AIDS. See Michael Closen & Scott
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harsh consequences when criminal penalties are at stake. Controversial
results abound in criminal prosecutions of HIV-positive defendants.
One state court reinstated a conviction for attempted murder based
upon the defendant's spitting and throwing of blood.7 A federal appeals
court held that the bite of an HIV positive person constituted use of a
"deadly and dangerous" weapon in an assault prosecution. 8 In other
cases, criminal defendants diagnosed or merely perceived as HIV-posi-
tive were subject to irrational and humiliating courtroom treatment. 9
Constitutional challenges to criminal sodomy laws provide a valua-
ble setting for assessing the rationality ofjudicial response to HIV-AIDS
issues. In particular, homosexuals' legal challenges to these laws' pro-
scriptions of private, noncommercial, consensual, same-sex sexual activ-
ities raise two of the most provocative issues of our time: preventing the
spread of HIV-AIDS and protecting the right to privacy in intimate acts.
Courts face difficulty in resolving these challenges when supporters and
opponents of same-sex sodomy statutes raise emotionally charged HIV-
AIDS issues linked to a variety of complex medical, social and psycho-
logical concerns.
The effect of these arguments on courts and on legislatures is
profound. As one commentator noted: "The trend towards decriminal-
ization of gay sex has been halted by AIDS .... 10 Now that the AIDS
hysteria has abated somewhat, courts may again be willing to view the
sodomy issue rationally. In Commonwealth v. Wasson," the Kentucky
Supreme Court struck down the Kentucky same-sex sodomy law on state
constitutional grounds. The decision provided a ringing affirmation of
personal privacy rights and rejected irrational arguments based on HIV-
AIDS concerns. It remains an open question whether other courts will
take a similar view or will bend to popular pressures.
Part I of this Article places constitutional challenges to sodomy laws
in their legal context by surveying major state and federal cases con-
Isaacman, HIV-AIDS and Governmental Control of Information: International Denial of Human
Rights, 4 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 107, 111-14 (1992).
7. State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing trial court deci-
sion and reinstating attempted murder conviction).
8. United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988). For a critical view of the
decision in Moore, see Carlton D. Stansbury, Comment, Deadly and Dangerous Weapons and
AIDS: The Moore Analysis is Likely to be Dangerous, 74 IowA L. REV. 951 (1989) (concluding
that, although the court did not expressly rely on the defendant's HIV status to uphold the
conviction, the issue very likely influenced the outcome).
9. See, e.g., Wiggins, 602 A.2d at 212 (trial judge ordered guards to wear rubber
gloves and ordered jury not to touch trial exhibits, even though it was unknown whether
Wiggins was HIV-positive); Beason v. Harcleroad, 805 P.2d 700 (Or. App. 1991) (prosecu-
tors discover that suspect is homosexual and fabricated a story to news media that he was
gay, had AIDS and induced others to have unprotected sex while concealing illness); State
v. Hudson, 1989 Tenn. Crim. App. Lexis 773 (Nov. 8, 1989) (leaving sacks marked "CAU-
TION, AIDS" within sight ofjury is not reversible error, even though the sacks were filled
with evidence from another trial).
10. Arthur Leonard, Report from the Legal Front: Gay/Lesbian Rights, THE NATION,July 2,
1990, at 12.
11. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, 1992 WL 235412 (Ky. Sept. 24,
1992), aff'g No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990).
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fronting the issue. Part II examines how challenges to state sodomy
laws frame HIV-AIDS issues. The Article also evaluates the merits of
arguments based on HIV-AIDS with particular focus on state sodomy
laws. In conclusion, the Article proposes a reasoned basis for the
courts' responses to those arguments.
I. CRIMINAL PROSCRIPTIONs AGAINST CONSENSUAL
SAME-SEX SEXUAL AcTIvMEs
In 1986 the United States Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick 12
held that there is no federal constitutional right to privacy in consensual,
same-sex sexual activities. Thus, in the years since Hardwick, challengers
to sodomy laws have shifted their efforts from federal to state courts.
These efforts produced substantial recent success, most notably the
1992 Kentucky Supreme Court decision Commonwealth v. Wasson.l 3 As in
other areas of the law, litigants now find state courts far more receptive
than federal courts to claims based upon individual constitutional
liberties. 14
To uphold the criminalization of consensual, same-sex sexual activi-
ties against constitutional challenge, the courts must find sufficient gov-
ernment justification for the challenged statutes.' 5 In this context
supporters of the same-sex sodomy statutes raise the AIDS specter by
arguing that these statues effectively deter the spread of HIV-AIDS.
A. State "Sodomy" Statutes
In 1986 the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia sodomy law in Hard-
wick, 16 a case involving oral sex between two men in a private dwelling.
Today, criminal statutes in about twenty-one states continue to forbid
private, consensual, same-sex sexual activities.' 7 Contrary to common
12. 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
13. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG; see also State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992), No. D-2393 (Tex. argued Jan. 5, 1993); Michigan Organization for Human
Rights v. Kelly, No. 88-815820 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990). Even before Hardwick, courts
in Pennsylvania and New York had invalidated sodomy laws on constitutional grounds. See
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (invalid exercise of police power and
violation of equal protection); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 987 (1981) (violation of equal protection and right to privacy).
14. This trend has been the subject of substantial recent commentary. See, e.g., Kevin
Cullen, Scales Tip to State Courts: Rights Lawyers Avoiding Federal Route, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
28, 1991, at 1; W.John Moore, In Whose Court?, 23 NATIONALJ. 2396 (1991). The trend is
particularly notable in privacy and Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Moe v. Secretary of
Admin., 417 N.E.2d 382 (Mass. 1981) (rejecting holding in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980), and upholding the right to public funding of abortions under the state constitu-
tional right to privacy); People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992) (rejecting holding in
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) and finding a legitimate expectation of privacy
in land based on the Fourth Amendment).
15. The particular level of governmental justification required depends upon the con-
stitutional basis for challenging the statute. See infra notes 34-68 and accompanying text.
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
17. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW at 9-10 (Harv. L. Rev. eds., 1989) [hereinafter
SEXUAL ORIENTATION]. The study lists twenty-four statutes, three of which have since been
invalidated by courts. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. The proscribed acts gener-
ally, but not uniformly, involve anal and/or oral sex. Some of these statutes also prohibit
1993] 339
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belief, the states continue to invoke and enforce these criminal sodomy
statutes, albeit with less frequency. In the last six years, several state
challenges have been raised in connection with arrests and/or prosecu-
tions under these statutes. The Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the
state statute,' 8 while the highest state court in Kentucky and lower state
courts in Michigan and Texas invalidated the statutes.' 9
The underlying facts of Commonwealth v. Wasson illustrate the role of
state sodomy statutes. During 1985 the Lexington, Kentucky police de-
partment engaged in an undercover operation designed to generate
prosecutions under Kentucky's sodomy law. 20 Over a period of roughly
two months undercover police officers drove to an area they believed to
be frequented by homosexuals. The officers parked their cars and en-
gaged in conversations to determine if their targets would invite them to
engage in illegal sexual conduct. The police officers secretly recorded
the conversations, including a conversation with Mr. Wasson.2 1 After
talking with an undercover officer for twenty to twenty-five minutes, Mr.
Wasson invited the officer to his home.22 Before agreeing, the officer
asked about the activities involved. At the officer's prodding, Mr. Was-
son mentioned acts that were criminal under the Kentucky statute.
23
The officer departed at that point. 24 Mr. Wasson was arrested and sub-
sequently charged him with soliciting a criminal act. Both Mr. Wasson
and the officer were over twenty-one years old. The state did not allege
that there was any offer or exchange of money, or that any public or
private sexual activities occurred. The court postponed the trials of four
other people arrested under similar circumstances pending the outcome
of Mr. Wasson's constitutional challenge to the Kentucky sodomy law.
2 5
certain private consensual sexual activities between persons of the opposite sex. Prosecu-
tions for heterosexual sodomy sometimes occur in connection with other cimes, such as
rape, but rarely are brought when sodomy is the only crime charged. For an example of
one such case, see, e.g., State v. Bateman, 540 P.2d 732 (Ariz. App. 1975), vacated, 547 P.2d
6 (Ariz. 1976) (reinstating conviction), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976).
For ease of reference, this Article refers to all laws criminalizing consensual private
sexual activities as sodomy laws. For an overview of the specifics of these laws, see SEXUAL
ORIENTATION at 9-10 nn.l-6.
18. State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
19. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, 1992 WL 235412 (Ky. Sept. 24,
1992), aff'g No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990); Michigan Organization for Human
Rights v. Kelly, No. 88-815820 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d
201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
20. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.100 criminalizes "deviate sexual intercourse" between
persons of the same sex. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510.010(1) defines "deviate sexual inter-
course" as "any act of sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one (1) person and
the mouth or anus of another."
21. Wasson, No 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. This description of the events, presented to the court by defense counsel, was not
contested by the state. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 3 (Ky.
Sept. 24, 1992), aff'g No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990).
25. See infra notes 34-68 and accompanying text.
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B. The Hardwick Decision
Considering the views of the current United States Supreme Court,
state court challenges will rest primarily on state rather than federal con-
stitutional grounds. 26 In Bowers v. Hardwick the Supreme Court rejected
a federal constitutional right to privacy challenge to Georgia's sodomy
law. 2 7 Justice Lewis Powell cast the deciding vote for the majority in a
five-to-four decision. Powell later repudiated the Court's decision. 2 8 In
Hardwick, the Court framed the issue as whether the constitution pro-
vides a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. With the
issue so framed, the Court found no fundamental right at stake and re-
jected the challenge. 29 The Court sustained the law merely by finding a
rational relationship between the challenged law and a legitimate gov-
ernmental justification. 30 This legitimate governmental justification was
the state's interest in regulating morality.
3 '
Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent. Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Stevens joined justice Blackmun in rejecting the majority's characteriza-
tion of the issue. The dissenters found the right involved to be " 'the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men', namely, 'the right to be let alone.' ",32 The dissent argued there
was no distinction between the sodomy statute and other privacy inva-
sions struck down by the Court, including the right to buy and use con-
26. SeeJuli A. Morris, Note, Challenging Sodomy Statutes: State Constitutional Protections for
Sexual Privacy, 66 IND. L.J. 609 (1991) (contending that federal due process challenges to
sodomy laws are futile after Hardwick).
27. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). Michael Hardwick was arrested in
his bedroom by a police officer who was present to serve papers on Mr. Hardwick in an
unrelated matter and who saw him having sex with another adult male. The charges were
not pursued, but Hardwick and a married couple brought a federal action seeking a decla-
ration that the Georgia statute, which criminalizes both homosexual and heterosexual sod-
omy, is unconstitutional. Finding that Hardwick, but not the married couple, had standing
to challenge the statute, the Eleventh Circuit went on to hold that the statute implicated a
fundamental right to privacy, and remanded for a determination of a compelling state
interest. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204-07, 1211 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478
U.S. 186 (1986).
Much has been written on state sodomy laws; the vast of majority of these writings are
critical of Hardwick and support the invalidation or repeal of sodomy laws. See, e.g. ,John C.
Sims, Moving Towards Equal Treatment of Homosexuals, 23 PAC. L.J. 1543 (1992); Norman
Vieira, Hardwick and the Right of Privacy, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181 (1988); SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION, supra note 17, at 9-27.
28. Anand Agneshwar, Powell Concedes Error in Key Privacy Ruling; Vote to Sustain Sodomy
Law At High Court Called Mistake, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 26, 1990 at 1, col. 3. A majority of the
justices who decided the Hardwick decision would therefore hold that same-sex sodomy
statutes violate the right to privacy under the federal constitution. But, given that Justice
Powell, in addition to two of the Hardwick dissenters, Justice Brenna and the late Justice
Marshall, are no longer on the Court, Hardwick is not likely to be overturned in the near
future.
29. The Court held that the Constitution does not "extend a fundamental right to
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192.
30. Had the Court found that a fundamental right was at stake, then it would have had
to find that the statute was supported by a compelling state interest-a much more difficult
burden for the state to meet. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1454-
65 (2d. ed. 1988).
31. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
32. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
1993]
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traceptives and the right to obtain an abortion.3 3 The dissent also
rejected the majority's state-interest analysis and found the state's inter-
est in enforcing morality ambiguous at best, thus that interest could not
alone sustain the statute.3 4 The Hardwick majority did not explicitly ad-
dress HIV-AIDS issues, but the dissent noted that the litigants and amici
curiae presented those issues to the Court.
3 5
C. Post-Hardwick Challenges to State Sodomy Laws
After Hardwick, litigants have primarily resorted to state courts in
their fights against same-sex sodomy laws. 36 As Hardwick noted, states
remain free to derive from their state constitutions higher levels of pro-
tection for individual rights than those provided by the federal Constitu-
tion.3 7 In contrast to the implicit right to privacy found in the United
States Constitution, some eleven state constitutions explicitly provide
for such rights.3 8 Courts in a number of other states have held that their
state constitutions contain various implied rights to privacy.3 9 Equal
protection provisions-as distinct from right to privacy provisions-of
both the federal and state constitutions may provide an additional basis
for successful challenges to sodomy laws.
40
1. Right to Privacy Challenges to State Sodomy Laws
While state constitutions need not recognize any right to privacy,
those constitutions may provide rights above and beyond those guaran-
33. Id. at 199-214.
34. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It
thus appears that under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-56 (1973), the dissent would have
required the state to show both a compelling state interest in the statute and the absence
of less burdensome alternatives. See Allan Ides, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Enigmatic Fifth
Vote and the Reasonableness of Moral Certitude, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 95 (1992).
35. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 208.
36. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. The Missouri Supreme Court up-
held such a statute in State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986), while the highest state
court in Kentucky and lower courts in Michigan and Texas have invalidated the statutes on
privacy grounds. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992), aff'g
No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992); Michigan Org. for Human Rights v. Kelly, No. 88-815820 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July
9, 1990).
37. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190.
38. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 12; HAw. CONST. art. I, §§ 6,7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. , § 5;
Miss. CONST. art. III, § 23; MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH.
CONST. art. I, 7.
39. See, e.g., Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1972) (right to privacy barred reten-
tion of non-conviction arrest records); State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368 (N.J. 1979) (right to
privacy invalidated restrictive zoning ordinance banning alternative families); Jacobs v.
Benedict, 301 N.E.2d 723, 725 (Ohio Misc. 1973), aff'd, 316 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio Ct. App.
1973) (right to privacy invalidated school limitations on hair length); In re B., 394 A.2d
419 (Pa. 1978) (right to privacy in psychiatric records); Texas State Employees Union v.
Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987)
(right to privacy in confidential personal information violated by policy of requiring em-
ployees to take polygraph test). Implied rights to privacy do not necessarily extend to the
right to engage in consensual sexual activity; as discussed herein, those issues remain to be
litigated on a case-by-case basis
40. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
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teed by the federal Constitution. Thus the notable federal right to pri-
vacy cases provide an important context for state constitutional
challenges to sodomy laws in that they provide a basis for state rights to
privacy and act as points of departure for creating higher levels of rights
than exist at the federal level.
The Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut41 set
forth the constitutionally based "right to privacy" as a matter of substan-
tive due process. The Court based the right on the "penumbras" of
various provisions of the Bill of Rights. 42 In Griswold the Court invali-
dated a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married
couples.4 3 The majority found that the statute violated a "fundamental"
right to privacy that is inherent in marriage and that no compelling state
interest supported the violation.
4 4
The Griswold decision provided the impetus for an initially rapid ex-
pansion of the newly articulated right to privacy. Later cases invoked
the right to privacy to overturn a statute prohibiting a person's viewing
of pornography in the home, 45 a statute prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptives to an unmarried couple 46 and a statute prohibiting a wo-
man from obtaining an abortion. 4 7 The Court in Hardwick, however, de-
clined to extend the constitutional right to privacy to private,
consensual, same-sex sexual activities.
48
For this analysis the important point about Hardwick is its state in-
terest discussion. For a statute to survive a right to privacy challenge the
court must find a state interest that is sufficiently compelling to override
the particular privacy interest.4 9 How the court chooses to define the
privacy interest at stake is crucial. The Hardwick court found no funda-
mental right at stake by casting the issue as whether there is a right to
engage in homosexual sodomy50 rather than whether there is a right to be
left alone in the privacy of one's bedroom. The sole state interest iden-
tified by the Court, "majority sentiments about the morality of homosex-
uality," outweighed whatever privacy interest upon which the Georgia
statute infringed.
5 1
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. Id. at 484.
43. Id. at 485-86.
44. Id. at 485-86.
45. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
46. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972). This decision determined that
unmarried couples have the same right to privacy, under the equal protection clause, that
married couples have to use contraceptives. The court narrowly limited its consideration
of privacy rights to control over matters of procreation.
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154, 162-66 (1973).
48. Commentators across the political spectrum have criticized the Court's interpreta-
tion of its privacy cases in Hardwick. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 346
(Harv. Univ. Pres., 1992) ("the majority and concurring opinions in Hardwick betray a lack
of knowledge about the history and character of the regulation of sexuality"); TRIBE, supra
note 30, at 1422-35.
49. For a general discussion of the state interest analysis in the context of state sod-
omy law, see Ides, supra note 34, at 95.
50. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190.
51. Id. at 196. Critics have questioned this analysis. Judge Posner, for example, ar-
1993] 343
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Because it did not find a fundamental right to privacy in consensual,
same-sex sexual activities among adults, the Court was able to apply a
rational basis test for the challenged statute. The Court thus avoided
the more serious analysis necessary to support the finding of a compel-
ling state interest.5 2 The Court's majoritarian view of the morality anal-
ysis has been rejected by most state courts53 and commentators 54 as not
being sufficient state interest to sustain sodomy laws.
Despite the Hardwick outcome, some state courts have found state
constitutional privacy rights in consensual, same-sex sexual activities, as
shown by the Wasson decision. 55 Wasson traced the philosophical and
historical bases of individual liberties and relied on an implied state
right to privacy to strike down the statute.56 The court rejected
majoritarian morality as a basis for the statute5 7 concluding that "immo-
rality in private which does 'not operate to the detriment of others' is
placed beyond the reach of state action by the guarantees of liberty in
the Kentucky Constitution."
'5 8
Other courts refuse to accept the United States Supreme Court's
framing of the issue as a right to engage in homosexual sodomy.5 9 The
state interest analysis in these cases has been and will be much more
extensive than that in Hardwick because such decisions identify privacy
interests that are more than minimally significant. 60
Although the Court in Hardwick did not explicitly discuss HIV-AIDS
issues, a number of briefs submitted to the Court did raise these con-
cerns. 6 1 State courts considering challenges to sodomy laws have di-
rectly addressed these issues when both upholding and invalidating
state statutes. 62 It is highly likely that state court challenges to same-sex
gues that the Court's state interest analysis more likely reflected unarticulated religious
principles than society's views of homosexuality. POSNER, supra note 48, at 345-46. For a
similar criticism, see Ides, supra note 31, at 104 ("Faith may well be a sufficient basis for
regulating one's own life; it does not, however, provide an adequate basis for regulating
the life of another through the iron fist of the state.").
52. Cf Texas State Employees Union v. Department of Mental Health & Mental Re-
tardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987) (the implied right of privacy in the Texas
constitution "should yield only when the government can demonstrate that an intrusion is
reasonably warranted for the achievement of a compelling governmental objective that can
be achieved by no less intrusive, more reasonable means").
53. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992), aff'g
No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E. 2d 936, 940 n.3
(N.Y. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50
(Pa. 1980); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). But see State v. Walsh,
713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
54. See POSNER, supra note 48, at 344-46; Ides, supra note 34, at 104.
55. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992), aff'g No. 86-
XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990).
56. Id. at 9-25.
57. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 31-33 (citation omitted).
58. Id. at 20.
59. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
60. See Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 31-33 (finding no rational basis for de-
nying homosexuals equal protection of the law).
61. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
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sodomy statutes will increase in frequency and that those challenges will
almost certainly implicate HIV-AIDS issues with a state interest analysis.
2. Equal Protection Challenges to State Sodomy Laws
The defendant in Hardwick did not present an equal protection chal-
lenge to the state sodomy statute, under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.6 3 Thus the nation's
highest court has not resolved the validity of a federal equal protection
challenge to sodomy laws. 64 State courts remain free to find rights
under state constitutional equal protection provisions even if the federal
Constitution does not provide such rights.
65
An equal protection challenge to a law may fall into one of three
categories on a sliding scale of required governmental interests. First,
courts strictly scrutinize laws based upon a suspect classification-a cate-
gory that so far encompasses only race, national origin, alienage and
religion. To sustain such a law, the court must find that the law is neces-
sary to achieve a compelling state interest and that there are no less
discriminatory alternatives. 66 Second, laws based on a quasi-suspect
classification, such as gender and illegitimacy, must be substantially re-
lated to an important state interest. 67 Third, for other classifications not
affecting fundamental interests, the court need only find a rational basis
for the law that meets a legitimate state interest.
68
Commentators argue that laws that classify on the basis of sexual
orientation should be subject to strict scrutiny because of the history of
63. The Georgia statute at issue in Hardwick applied to both homosexual and hetero-
sexual sodomy, thereby apparently precluding a facial challenge to the statute on the
grounds that it discriminated against homosexuals. As noted supra in note 27, the Hard-
wick majority only considered the statute as applied to homosexual activities because the
heterosexual challengers to the statute had been denied standing.
64. In the context of military service, a California federal district court applied the
federal Equal Protection Clause to homosexuals. Meinhold v. Department of Defense, CV
92-6044 TJH (JRx) (C.D. Cal. Jan 29, 1993). Analyzing the asserted bases for excluding
gay men and lesbians from the military, the court found the military's policy not to be
rationally related to permissable governmental goals. Meinhold v. Dep't of Defense, CV
92-6044, slip op. at 3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1993) (citing Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160,
1166-67, cert. den., 113 S. Ct. (1992). Commentators have long argued that equal protec-
tion analysis should apply to homosexuality. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation
and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988) (arguing that Hardwick left the door open for an equal protection
analysis applicable to homosexuality); Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the Applica-
tion of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 797 (1984). Cf Sims, supra note 27, at 1562, 1565 (arguing that Hardwick likely fore-
closes successful application of federal equal protection analysis to homosexuality).
65. See, JAMEs KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1.07 (1992).
66. See, eg., City of Richmond v.J. A. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
67. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See, e.g. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
441 (illegitimacy-based classifications); Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 450
U.S. 464 (1981) (gender-based classifications).
68. See generally TRIBE, supra note 27, at 1440-4 1; SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 17,
at 15-16. The Meinhold court found that the military proscription against service by homo-
sexuals failed to meet even the rational basis test. Meinhold v. Dep't of Defense, CV 92-
6044 TJH (JRx) (C.C. Cal. Jan. 29, 1993).
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discrimination against gay men and lesbians. 6 9 So far, however, the
courts have subjected claims based upon sexual orientation classifica-
tions to the rational basis test.70 The Wasson court found that the chal-
lenged state sodomy statute failed even that test.7 1 The court rejected
the argument that morality provides a rational basis for the statute in
language that goes beyond equal protection analysis of earlier gay and
lesbian' rights cases.
72
The question is whether a society that no longer criminalizes
adultery, fornication, or deviate sexual intercourse between
heterosexuals, has a rational basis to single out homosexual
acts for different treatment. Is there a rational basis for declar-
ing this one type of sexual immorality so destructive of family
values as to merit criminal punishment whereas other acts of
sexual immorality which were likewise forbidden by the same
religious and traditional heritage of Western civilization are
now decriminalized? If there is a rational basis for different
treatment it has yet to be demonstrated in this case. We need
not sympathize, agree with, or even understand the sexual pref-
erence of homosexuals in order to recognize their right to
equal treatment before the bar of criminal justice.
73
Wasson demonstrates a sound basis substantiating a state constitu-
tional right to privacy or a federal or state constitutional right to equal
69. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1166. The view that sexual orientation is an
immutable characteristic is now generally accepted among psychiatrists and psychologists.
See generally A. BELL, ET AL., SEXUAL PREFERENCE: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN
(1981). In his recent book on law and sexuality, Judge Posner engages in an extensive
review of the social and empirical evidence on the issues of the origin of homosexuality
and the possibilities either that a more tolerant society will produce greater numbers of
homosexuals or that the young are susceptible to homosexual conversion. Judge Posner
concludes, "When we consider how difficult-how well-nigh impossible-it appears to be
to convert a homosexual into a heterosexual, despite all the personal and social advan-
tages to being a heterosexual in this and perhaps any society, the issue of homosexual
seduction, recruitment, or propaganda is placed in perspective. How much more difficult it
must be for homosexuals to convert a heterosexual into one of themselves!" POSNER,
supra note 48, at 298-99. It is perhaps only a matter of time before some courts begin to
recognize that sexual orientation is a category worthy of a high level of constitutional pro-
tection.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to establish that sexual orientation is a
suspect or quasi-suspect classification deserving of strict or intermediate scrutiny for equal
protection purposes, it is important to note that should courts adopt such scrutiny, the
state same-sex sodomy statutes will be far more difficult to justify.
70. See KUSHNER, supra note 65, at § 5.12; Meinhold v. Dep't of Defense, CV 92-6044
TJH (JRx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1993).
71. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 28-34 (Ky. Sept. 24,
1992) aff'g No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990). See also Citizens for Responsible
Behavior v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 654-56 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding homosexu-
als to be entitled to equal protection of the laws under the United States and California
constitutions, and applying a rational basis test to strike down an initiative that would have
banned anti-discrimination measures protecting homosexuals and those with HIV-AIDS).
72. Courts in New York and Pennsylvania relied upon the right of unmarried persons
to equal protection of the laws to invalidate state sodomy laws that applied to all unmar-
ried persons, including both heterosexuals and homosexuals. People v. Onofre, 415
N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (violation of equal protection and
right to privacy); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (invalid exercise of
police power and violation of equal protection).
73. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 32-33 (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992).
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protection of the laws. At a minimum the government must prove that a
law forbidding consensual, same-sex sexual activities bears a rational re-
lationship to a legitimate governmental interest. 74 It is in this context
that litigants and courts will raise HIV-AIDS policy issues with even
greater frequency in the years ahead.
II. HIV-AIDS ISSUES AS A BASIS FOR ARGUING STATE INTERESTS IN
SAME-SEX SODOMY LAWS
In cases from Hardwick to Wasson, litigants and amid curiae barraged
the courts with arguments on the impact that state sodomy laws have on
transmission of HIV-AIDS. Supporters of sodomy statutes argue that
the laws act both as a legal deterrent against high-risk activities and as a
moral condemnation of a life-style fostering health risks. 7 5 These argu-
ments have a surface appeal to courts. Even when not explicitly relied
upon, the arguments may be implicit in decisions upholding these laws.
Such arguments supporting same-sex sodomy statutes have the poten-
tial to feed into the bias that pervades the legal system in connection
with HIV-AIDS issues. These arguments deserve close scrutiny from a
rational viewpoint to eliminate prejudice and hysteria-based arguments.
A. The Transmission of HIV
Reports of the first cases of HIV-AIDS illness appeared in 1981.76
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the etiologic agent of HIV-
AIDS illness, can infect and destroy the body's immune system. 7 7 Cases
of documented HIV transmission include sexual contact which involves
the exchange of bodily fluids, infection with contaminated blood or
blood products and perinatal infection from mother to child. 78
Health care experts consider HIV-AIDS illness a global pandemic
affecting every country in the world. The illness has a particularly devas-
tating impact on African countries. 79 As of April, 1991, reports show
171,865 cases of AIDS in the United States.8 0 Approximately fifty-nine
percent of these reported cases were homosexual or bisexual men who
did not use intravenous drugs.8 ' Twenty-nine percent of the cases were
intravenous drug users, seven percent of whom were gay or bisexual
males. Six percent were heterosexuals who had sex with either an in-
fected person or someone in a high-risk group.8 2 In urban areas that
have high rates of intravenous drug use, intravenous drug users account
74. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 1440-41.
75. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
76. Abe M. Macher, HIV Disease/AIDS: Medical Background, in AIDS AND THE LAW 1
(Wiley L. Publications eds., 2d ed. 1992).
77. Anthony S. Fauci, The Human Immunodeficiency Virus: Infectivity and Mechanisms of
Pathogenesis, 239 SCIENCE 617-22 (1988).
78. Id. at 617; Macher, supra note 76, at 4-5.
79. Macher, supra note 76, at 4; Fauci, supra note 77, at 617.
80. Macher, supra note 76, at 5.
81. Id.
82. Id. The remainder of the cases included hemophiliacs and recipients of infected
blood, blood products or tissue.
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for a higher rate of new AIDS cases than do gay men.8 3 The Centers for
Disease Control estimates that, by the end of 1993, there would be a
total of 390,000-480,000 cases of AIDS reported in the United States.
8 4
B. HIV-AIDS Issues in Challenges to Sodomy Laws
1. Background
Since AIDS became a matter of public concern in the early 1980s,
litigants have raised HIV-AIDS issues in challenges to sodomy laws. In
Baker v. Wade, 85 a pre-Hardwick decision, opponents of a federal chal-
lenge to the Texas sodomy law argued "the public health and safety of
all citizens of Texas will be harmed if the spread of AIDS is not
stopped," and that the sodomy law was essential "to combat the AIDS
menace." 8 6 The District Court rejected that argument and held the stat-
ute invalid. 8 7 The Fifth Circuit reversed, upholding the statute on
grounds similar to those used in Hardwick.88 While not explicit in the
Fifth Circuit's opinion, HIV-AIDS issues probably had some impact on
the court's decision.
8 9
In Hardwick, the state argued in its brief on appeal that the compel-
ling state interest in preventing the spread of HIV-AIDS favored Geor-
gia's sodomy statute.90 An amicus brief supporting the state's position
argued that the statute was necessary to deter "potentially lethal behav-
ior," that is, homosexual activities leading to the transmission of HIV. 9 '
Although the majority opinion did not directly address HIV-AIDS, the
Hardwick dissent criticized the briefs submitted in favor of the law for
making groundless arguments that the statute supported public policy
goals.
9 2
Efforts to use HIV-AIDS issues as an explicit basis for upholding
sodomy laws came to fruition in State v. Walsh, a 1986 Missouri Supreme
83. Id.
84. Id. at 17. The recent change in the definition of AIDS means that these numbers
are dramatically understated. The United States Center for Disease Control and Preven-
tion ("CDC") has included three additional diseases the appearance of which in an HIV-
positive person will result in an AIDS diagnosis, and has also added to the AIDS definition
a drop in the number of CD4 cells, or T-cells, to 200 per cubic millimeter of blood. The
CDC estimates that the new definition will produce an increase in the number of the coun-
try's new AIDS patients by seventy-five percent in 1993. Sheryl Stolberg, New AIDS Defini-
tion to Increase Tally, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1992, at 1.
85. 106 F.R.D. 526, 528-29 (N.D. Tex. 1985), rev'don other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). For a fuller analysis of the Baker decision, see
Charles Spiegel, Privacy, Sodomy, AIDS & Schools: Case Studies in Equal Protection, 1986 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 221, 241-47.
86. Baker, 106 F.R.D. at 528-29.
87. Id. at 534-35.
88. 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985). See Spiegel, supra note 85, at 246; Susan Mc-
Guigan, The AIDS Dilemma: Public Health v. Criminal Law, 4 J. L. & INEqUALrry 545, 567-68
(1986).
89. See McGuigan, supra note 88, at 568.
90. Brief for Petitioner at 37, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1985). See Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 290 n.3 (1985).
91. Brief for David Robinson, Jr., as Amicus Curiae at 5, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1985).
92. 478 U.S. at 208 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Court decision. 93 The Walsh court upheld the state's sodomy statute by
relying on the state's interests in morality and in deterring activities
leading to the spread of HIV-AIDS:
We further find that [the challenged statute] is rationally re-
lated to the State's concededly legitimate interest in protecting
the public health. The State has argued that forbidding homo-
sexual activity will inhibit the spread of [AIDS].
94
Thus, with Walsh, the HIV-AIDS rational for upholding same-sex sod-
omy statutes became explicit.
2. The Wasson Decision
Supporters of laws prohibiting same-sex sexual activities continue
to forcefully make arguments like those relied upon by the Walsh court.
Recently, litigants have also used these arguments to try to roll back
state courts' recognition of the right to privacy. In Commonwealth v. Was-
son,9 5 the litigants squarely addressed HIV-AIDS as a justification for
sodomy laws.
In Wasson, the trial court conducted an extensive hearing on the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the charges. The court heard testimony
from defense experts in cultural anthropology, theology, social history,
psychology and medicine. 96 The state offered no evidence. Initially, the
court found the Kentucky constitution's explicit right to privacy broader
than the implied federal constitutional right to privacy.9 7 The court
then invalidated the statute on the ground that it "clearly seeks to regu-
late the most profoundly private conduct and in so doing impermissably
[sic] invades the privacy of the citizens of this state." 9 8 On appeal, the
intermediate court affirmed the trial court's action striking down the
statute on privacy grounds. 9 9 In addition, the appellate court found the
law violated Kentucky's constitutional guarantee to equal protection of
the laws by criminalizing certain conduct with a person of the same sex
but not the same conduct with persons of the other sex. 10 0
The state appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court. In its brief on
appeal the state raised the AIDS-HIV specter in stark language:
The record before this Court contains undisputed testimony
that homosexuals are more promiscuous than heterosexuals,
93. 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
94. Id. at 512.
95. No. 86M859 (Ky. Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 1986). The defendant was charged with solic-
iting sodomy in the fourth degree, and challenged the underlying sodomy statute rather
than the solicitation statute. The Kentucky statute criminalizes "deviate sexual inter-
course" between persons of the same sex. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1990). Section 510.010(1) defines "deviate sexual intercourse" as "any act of sex-
ual gratification involving the sex organs of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of
another." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990). This statute is
typical in defining sodomy as oral or anal sex between persons of the same gender.
96. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 3-5 (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992).
97. Wasson, No. 86M859, slip op. at 2-3 (Ky. Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 1986).
98. Id.
99. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 86-XX-048 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990).
100. Id. at 13-14.
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that infectious diseases are more readily transmitted by anal
sodomy than by any other form of sexual copulation, that
homosexuals account for 73% of all AIDS cases in the United
States, that homosexuals enjoy the company of children, and
that homosexuals are more prone to engage in sex acts in pub-
lic than are heterosexuals.' 0 '
In one stroke the state argued that homosexuals are promiscuous, are
child-molesters and are responsible for the spread of HIV.' 0 2 The state
concluded that public health considerations alone justified the sodomy
statute. 103
The four-justice majority of the Kentucky Supreme Court explicitly
rejected this argument. The court found that the sodomy statute did not
fit the State's alleged public health goal. 10 4 Three justices dissented in
two separate opinions strongly arguing that HIV-AIDS provided a legiti-
mate basis for upholding the statute. 10 5 The dissenters adopted the
standard argument of supporters of same-sex sodomy laws: 1) same-sex
sexual activities account for a disproportionate percentage of the trans-
mission of HIV; 2) sodomy laws deter such activities and 3) this provides
a rational basis for upholding these laws. 10 6 It is important to analyze
these points carefully given judicial receptiveness to this argument.
C. HIV-AIDS as a Basis for Upholding Sodomy Statutes
If upholding a crime of consensual, same-sex sexual activity re-
quires only a rational basis, the lowest level of governmental justifica-
tion, then the goal of promoting the public health provides supporters
of sodomy statutes with a facially powerful argument.' 0 7 The Supreme
Court has long held that states may exercise their police power by pass-
ing laws designed to promote public health and safety, such as laws re-
quiring immunizations.10 8 Supporters of sodomy statutes argue that the
statutes are reasonably related to the legitimate governmental goal of
inhibiting the spread of HIV without being arbitrary and capricious in so
101. Brief of the State of Kentucky at 22, Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-
TG, 1992 WL 235412 (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992). The 73% figure was outdated at the time this
brief was submitted. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
102. In rejecting the state's state interest analysis, the Kentucky Supreme Court termed
the quoted passage as "simply outrageous." Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 31.
103. Brief of the State of Kentucky at 22, 42-43, Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG.
104. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 32. Accord, State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d
201, 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
105. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 15 (Lambert, J., dissenting); id. at 19
(Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 15-16 (Lambert, J., dissenting); id. at 5-6, 19, 22-23 (Wintersheimer, J.,
dissenting).
107. At least one court has required the government to show a compelling state inter-
est to justify a state sodomy law. Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 205 (finding no compelling state
interest in same-sex sodomy statute).
108. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (finding that law requiring small-
pox immunizations does not violate due process because threat to public health outweighs
burden on individual rights). See generally Chris D. Nichols, Note, AIDS-A New Reason to
Regulate Homosexuality, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 315, 332-38 (1984) (pre-Hardwick discussion of
state interest in regulating same-sex sexual activities).
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doing. 10 9 Because the government has a legitimate goal in inhibiting
the spread of HIV, the question becomes whether the law reasonably
relates to that goal.
1. HIV-AIDS Issues in Other Contexts
The Wasson decision explicitly rejected public health arguments,
based on HIV-AIDS, made in support of the Kentucky sodomy law. Per-
haps other courts will now review those arguments in a more rational
light. Courts, legislatures and regulators show some willingness to re-
ject arguments based primarily upon HIV-AIDS hysteria in non-criminal
areas of public policy. Perhaps the most significant shift in this respect
has occurred with respect to access to educational facilities. In the early
days of the epidemic well-publicized efforts were made to keep students
with HIV disease out of the schools." l0 Irrational and ill-informed be-
liefs about the methods of HIV transmission formed the basis of such
efforts. I I I
Some courts have come to reject efforts to prevent access to educa-
tional facilities as groundless and discriminatory. For example, in Board
of Education v. Cooperman,112 the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1987 re-
jected attempts to exclude students with HIV illness from classrooms.
Two years earlier the New Jersey Commissioners of Health and Educa-
tion jointly issued guidelines for admitting HIV infected children to the
schools. The Commissioners based the policy upon "epidemiological
studies indicating 'that AIDS is not transmitted through casual contact
as would be present in the school environment.' "1113 Local school
boards challenged the policy, and sought to bar such students from
schools even though the boards had medical opinions concluding a ban
was not medically-supportable." 4 Citing regulations granting local
boards some discretion to exclude students with contagious diseases,
the school boards argued they had the power to bar students from pub-
lic schools on health grounds." t 5 The New Jersey Supreme Court up-
held the Commissioners' power to issue regulations binding on the local
boards.' 16 The court conceded that the local boards had some power to
exclude students for health reasons.1 1 7 The majority, however, went on
to state:
[That power must be exercised reasonably. Like other government
109. A true reasonableness analysis is missing from the majority opinion in Hardwick.
See, e.g., Ides, supra note 34, at 101-05.
110. The most publicized case involved Ryan White, a young AIDS patient initially de-
nied access to public schools. See Indiana Judge Allows AIDS Victim Back in School, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1986, at 14, col. 16. See also Gene Schultz, AIDS: Public Health and the
Criminal Law, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 65, n.122 (1988).
111. See Larry Gostin, A Decade of a Maturing Epidemic: An Assessment and Directions for
Future Public Policy, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. Emics & PuB. PoL'y 7 (1990).
112. 523 A.2d 655 (N.J. 1987).
113. Id at 657.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 659.
116. Id. at 660.
117. Id.
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actors, the school board cannot act in an arbitrary fashion, es-
pecially when a child's right to an education is at stake. Reason-
ableness in the present context clearly involves appropriate deference to
medical expertise .... [A]ll the medical experts and medical au-
thorities agreed that the presence of the AIDS virus in the chil-
dren did not by itself pose any danger to other children or to
the child the board wished to exclude.
118
The court upheld the Commissioners' policies and found them binding
on the local boards.119
Mandatory testing for HIV and disclosure of HIV infection provide
the courts with another context for examining the rationality of public
health arguments based on HIV-AIDS. In New York State Society of Sur-
geons v. Axelrod, 120 the New York Court of Appeals considered whether
the New York Public Health Law must list HIV infection as a communi-
cable and sexually transmittable disease. When the Commissioner of
Health would not designate the disease as such, four New York medical
societies sued to require the designation. 121 The effect of the requested
designation would have been to authorize mandatory testing and con-
tact tracing in appropriate cases. 122 The Court of Appeals rejected the
medical societies' claim by finding that the Commissioner's decision was
not arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, the court found that voluntary
testing would foster cooperation with public health officials and main-
tain confidentiality. 12 3 The court showed a strong deference to medical
and psychological evidence presented by the Commissioner concerning
public health and HIV-AIDS.
124
In civil and regulatory contexts courts have increasingly shown a
sensitivity to medical evidence about HIV-AIDS in evaluating the ration-
ality of laws, regulations and policies. Courts in these civil cases have
generally not been confined by federal constitutional analysis in reach-
ing these results. Nonetheless, in cases where the stigma of criminal
conviction and the loss of liberty are at stake, courts should be at least as
careful when examining the rationality of arguments based upon HIV-
AIDS issues.
2. HIV-AIDS Issues in the Context of Sodomy Laws
Supporters of same-sex sodomy proscriptions invoke HIV-AIDS
concerns as a legitimate basis for upholding the statutes. Because of the
potential for irrational analysis in this context, courts should question
and evaluate the arguments carefully.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 662. For a similar result, based upon equal protection analysis, see District
27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
120. 572 N.E.2d 605 (N.Y. 1991).
121. Id. at 606.
122. Id. at 608.
123. Id. at 609.
124. Id. at 610.
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a. Do same-sex sodomy statutes correlate with the stated public health
goals?
Statutes criminalizing same-sex sexual activities generally outlaw all
oral and anal sex between persons of the same sex.' 25 At least one court
went further to uphold a state sodomy statute criminalizing contact be-
tween the genitals of one person and the hand of another person of the
same sex. 12 6 These statutes thus criminalize a broad range of sexual
activities between consenting adults.
Upon close analysis such statutes bear no rational relationship to
the goal of reducing the rate of transmission of HIV. The highest rate of
HIV sexual transmission occurs during anal-genital or vaginal-genital
contact. 127 Given this scientific fact, these statutes are both under-inclu-
sive and over-inclusive. The statutes are under-inclusive because they
do not proscribe extremely high-risk activities among heterosexuals,
such as the risk of male-to-female transmission during anal or vaginal
intercourse.128 At least two courts have acknowledged the disparity be-
tween the stated public health goal and the statutes' coverage when
striking down same-sex sodomy laws.
129
When compared to the asserted public health goal, these statutes
are also blatantly over-inclusive. First, some statutes criminalize hand-
genital contact among persons of the same sex. Such activity does not
involve an exchange of bodily fluids and therefore carries minimal risk
of HIV transmission. Second, the risk of HIV transmission during anal-
genital contact depends to a substantial degree upon whether a condom
is used.13 0 The same is true for oral-genital contact, which entails a far
lower degree of risk than anal intercourse.' 3 ' Third, lesbians as a group
historically run an extremely low risk of HIV transmission. ' 3 2 In light of
current transmission patterns, outlawing sex between women does not
further any substantial public health goal.' 3 3 Therefore a significant
125. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1992) ("A person commits the offense of
sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another.")
126. State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986). The defendant in Walsh allegedly felt
a police officer's genitals through the officer's pants. This activity obviously bears no rela-
tionship with the stated public health goal.
127. Nancy Meuller, The Epidemiology of the Human Immunodefiency Virus Infection, 14
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 250 (1986).
128. Mary E. Guinan & Ann Hardy, Epidemiology of AIDS in Women in the United States, 257
JAMA 2039 (1987); Meuller, supra note 127.
129. After acknowledging the "superficial appeal" of the state's argument based on
HIV-AIDS, the Wasson court noted, "The only medical evidence in the record before us
rules out any distinction between male-male and male-female anal intercourse as a method
of preventing AIDS." Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, slip op. at 32 (Ky.
Sept. 24, 1992). Accord, State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) ("We
note that [the challenged sodomy statute] does not prohibit similar heterosexual conduct
that may carry a high risk of transmitting sexual diseases").
130. Surgeon General's Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 17 (1986). See generally
Warren Winkelstein, Jr., et al., Reduction in Human Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission Among
Homosexual/Bisexual Men, 1982-1986, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 685 (1987).
131. Winkelstein, supra note 130.
132. Mueller, supra note 127, at 256.
133. Id.
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percentage of prohibited activity bears little or no relationship to the
stated public health goal, while unprohibited activity involves far greater
risks of HIV transmission.
In historical terms, the public health argument in support of same-
sex sodomy laws is even more dubious. As one Texas court noted, legis-
latures enacted these laws before the onset of the AIDS epidemic and
could not have intended that the statutes prevent transmission of
HIV. 134 Instead of relying on sodomy laws ill-suited to preventing the
spread of HIV-AIDS, some legislatures have considered and enacted
laws specifically criminalizing conduct that threatens the transmission of
HIV. 135 Whether such laws reflect sound public policy or not, those
legislatures did not find sodomy laws an effective deterrent mechanism.
The lawmakers more properly -sought to enact measures relating specifi-
cally to the HIV-AIDS issue.
13 6
Even assuming, contrary to the available evidence, that the sodomy
statutes only proscribe activities that constitute a public health threat,
the question remains whether same-sex sodomy laws actually deter the
criminalized activity. The premise of the deterrence rationale is that
criminal law has the inherent capacity to discourage people from acting
upon their basic sexual desires. Not surprisingly, the available evidence
shows otherwise.' 3 7 Moreover, as authorities enforce sodomy laws spo-
radically, it is doubtful that the laws have any real deterrent effect.'
3 8
The criminalized activity is largely undetectable and wide spread prose-
cution is extremely unlikely as the prohibited activity generally occurs in
the privacy of the home.'
3 9
A careful analysis of the scientific and medical evidence shows that
same-sex sodomy statutes ill-fit the stated public health goal of prevent-
ing the spread of HIV-AIDS. 140 The statutes by design do not fulfill
those goals and are ineffective in deterring the proscribed activities.
134. The district court in Baker v. Wade thus rejected the argument that the Texas
sodomy law was designed to inhibit the spread of HIV. Baker v. Wade, 106 F.R.D. 526,
534-35 (N.D. Tex. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986). However, the Walsh court upheld the Missouri sodomy law on pub-
lic health grounds, even though the legislative history reveals that the Missouri legislature
did not consider public health issues when enacting the state sodomy laws. State v. Walsh,
713 S.W.2d 508, 511-13 (Mo. 1986) See Schultz, upra note 110, at 73 n.43 (1988).
135. Donald Hermann, Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9 ST. Louis U.
L. REV. 351 (1990).
136. For a listing of legislatures that, as of 1990, had enacted or were considering such
statutes, see Hermann, supra note 135, at 370 n.106.
137. MARTIN S. WEINBERG & COLIN J. WILLIAMS, MALE HOMOSEXUALS: THEIR
PROBLEMS AND ADAPTATIONS (1974); Gilbert Geis, Reported Consequences of Decriminalization of
Consensual Adult Homosexuality in Seven States, 1 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 419 (1976).
138. See Hermann, supra note 135, at 355.
139. See Schultz, supra note 110, at 76.
140. Cf. District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct.
1986) (finding no rational relationship between policy of excluding HIV-positive children
from public school and goal of inhibiting spread of HIV).
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b. What likely effects do same-sex sodomy statutes have on HIV-
AIDS prevention and health care concerns?
There are powerful arguments that same-sex sodomy laws do not
promote, but rather undermine, public health efforts to prevent HIV-
AIDS transmission and to ensure better health care among those with
HIV-AIDS illness. 14 1 The arguments point to the statutes' effects on
education and treatment efforts, and on the psychological health of
those at risk for HIV-AIDS.
There are powerful arguments that same-sex sodomy laws interfere
with efforts to educate the public about safer sex practices. Such inter-
ference is an explicit goal of at least some supporters of laws.1 4 2 This
interference can occur in several ways. For example, closeted gay or
bisexual men most in need of education have limited contacts within the
gay community and little access to educational materials. For such peo-
ple, the stigma of acknowledging their practice of illegal activities deters
them from seeking out the information they may need to protect their
health.' 43 Another deterrence is the fear of identification and prosecu-
tion. Criminal sodomy laws could particularly deter any gay or bisexual
man living in an area without an organized gay community. Such an
individual would not likely come forward and seek information about
HIV-AIDS.
In states with criminal prohibitions of same-sex sexual activities
public health officials face a hard choice. The officials can either inform
the public about safer-sex activities that are illegal or allow ignorance
and the heightened risk of HIV transmission to prevail. The statutes
141. Many of these arguments were made to the Kentucky Supreme Court in Wasson by
amici curiae American Psychological Association, et al. Brief for American Psychological
Association, et al., as Amicus Curiae, Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG (Ky.
Sept. 24, 1992).
142. A group of amici curiae argued in Wasson that efforts to overturn same-sex state
sodomy laws are part of a "widely publicized homosexual agenda" which also includes
-[u]se [of] tax dollars to fund homoerotic AIDS/sex-education in all grades." Brief of
Citizens for Decency Through Law, Inc., et al., as Amici Curiae, at ii, Wasson, 90-SC-558-
TG.
The alleged agenda consisted of:
1) Legalize lesbian/gay marriages; 2) Give lesbians/gays parental and adoptive
rights; 3) Classify HIV-positive/AIDS carriers as disabled; 4) Enact "hate crimes"
laws to include sexual orientation; 5) Use tax dollars to fund homoerotic AIDS/
sex-education in all grades; 6) Amend laws to prohibit discrimination in employ-
ment, housing, public accommodations and public services; 7) Prohibit the mili-
tary from excluding anyone because of sexual preference; 8) Repeal all state
sodomy laws; 9) Repeal laws controlling the age of sexual consent.
Id. (citing Concerned Women for America, Concerned Women, Washington, D.C., March
1991).
143. See UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, How EFFEC-
TIVE Is AIDS EDUCATION? 12 (1988) (showing substantial reductions in unprotected high-
risk activities from 1985 to 1987). Recent studies have likewise reported dramatic efforts to
engage in safer-sex and reduce the risk of HIV transmission in places where there have
been effective public education efforts. See, e.g., Maria L. Ekstrand & Thomas J. Coates,
Maintenance of Safer Sexual Behaviors and Predictors of Risky Sex: The San Francisco Men's Health
Study, 80 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 973 (1990); Marshall H. Becker & Jill G. Joseph, AIDS and
Behavioral Change to Reduce Risk: A Review, 78 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 394 (1988).
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appear more likely to lead to an increase rather than a decrease in rates
of HIV transmission.
Besides chilling education efforts, the criminalization of same-sex
sexual activities could actually foster unsafe sex. 14 4 Criminal law in
states with same-sex sodomy statutes condemns homosexual expression
of affection and sexuality and casts homosexuals as social deviants. So-
cial stigmatization leads to prejudice and homophobia. Those gay peo-
ple who are unable to cope with this prejudice may internalize it and
become, in clinical terms, troubled and dysfunctional.' 4 5 The resulting
loss of self-esteem and development of self-hatred could lead to behav-
ior that is both psychologically and physically self-destructive.
14 6
Finally, prevention and treatment of HIV-AIDS depends upon con-
tinuing research and treatment. Same-sex sodomy laws deter gay men,
as a high risk group, from providing information to health officials and
researchers. The laws discourage homosexuals from seeking prompt
and adequate testing, counseling and medical care. Thus these laws un-
dermine the very public health goals upon which states rely in seeking to
sustain the laws.
Upon careful analysis the criminalization of consensual, private,
same-sex sexual activities between adults does far more harm than good.
The statutes deter those at risk from seeking essential information and
prevent public health educators from disseminating needed information
to the public to the fullest possible extent. The psychological data show
that criminalizing and stigmatizing sexual acts in which a large portion
of the population engages may promote rather than deter dangerous
activities while preventing education and treatment efforts.
III. CONCLUSION
Challenges to same-sex sodomy laws remain controversial. The
Kentucky Supreme Court in Wasson invoked an individual's right to pri-
vacy and equal protection of the laws when overturning a sodomy stat-
ute. It is, however, unclear whether Wasson signals a trend or is an
aberration in the age of HIV-AIDS. It does appear certain that state
courts will be the primary avenue of challenge so long as the United
States Supreme Court maintains its present ideological course.
As the Wasson and Morales decisions show, courts presented with
challenges to same-sex sodomy laws also appear increasingly aware of
and sensitive to the medical and scientific realities of HIV-AIDS. Cases
that deal directly or, as with challenges to sodomy laws, indirectly with
HIV-AIDS issues present several challenges to the courts. One impor-
tant challenge is to allow reason to prevail in an area fraught with the
144. See generally John Gonsiorek, Psychotherapeutic Issues with Gay and Lesbian Clients, in
INNOVATIONS IN CLINICAL PRACTICE: A SOURCEBOOK (Peter A. Keller & Lawrence C. Ritt,
eds., 1984).
145. E.g., John Gonsiorek & James Rudolph, Homosexual Identity, in HOMOSEXUALITY:
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 161-76 (John C. Gonsiorek ed., 1991).
146. Id.
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potential for irrational responses. Courts have increasingly managed to
come forward with reasoned responses in areas such as public educa-
tion, mandatory HIV testing and confidentiality.
When viewed carefully, the overwhelming weight of the evidence
now available shows that same-sex sodomy statutes do not promote
public health goals but rather are counter-productive. The issue needs
more study to determine the extent to which state sodomy laws in fact
have a detrimental effect on HIV-AIDS health care concerns. At a mini-
mum, it is certain that the "state interest" in these laws is much more
complex than the laws' supporters have acknowledged and that asser-
tions of such interest deserve careful scrutiny by the courts.

